PROGRESS OF THE LAW.

As

MARKED BY DECISIONS SELECTED FROM THE ADVANCE

REPORTS.

ADMINISTRATORS.

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania decides In re Warter's Estate, 57 At. 35, that where a widow and the sons
Appointment

of the decedent by a former marriage are bit-

terly antagonistic, the register should appoint
a disinterested person as administrator on the failure of
the parties to agree. See Elinaker'sEstate, 4 Watts, 34.

ANTI-TRUST ACT.

The Supreme Court of the United States decides in
W. W. Montague & Co. v. Edward S. Lozry, 24 S. C. R.
Combinatlon 307, that an association of wholesale dealers
In Restraint in tiles,' mantels, and grates in San Francisco
of Trade
and vicinity, and non-resident manufacturers
of tiles and fire-place fixtures, in which the dealers agree
'not to purchase from manufacturers not members of the
association, and not to sell unset tile to non-members for
less than list prices, which are more than fifty per cent.
higher than prices to members, while the manufacturers
agree not to sell their products or wares to non-members
at any price, under penalty of forfeiture of membership,
is an agreement or combination in restraint of trade within
the meaning of the Anti-trust Act of July 2, 189o. This
decision is of special interest because it is referred to several
times in the Northern Securities Decision. It cites briefly
the former adjudications upon the Sherman Act.
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APPEALS.

It is decided by the Supreme Court of the United States
in Bankers" Mutual Casualty Company v. Minneapolis, St.
Judgment of Paul and Sault Ste. Marie Railway Company,
Circuit Court 24 S. C. -R. 325, that a suit against a railway
of Appeans
company engaged in carrying the United States
mails under the Federal laws and postal regulations to recover the value of a registered package, alleged to have
been lost through its negligence, does not arise under the
Federal Constitution and laws so as to deprive the judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals therein of the finality
which exists when the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court
depends entirely on diverse citizenship, where plaintiff relied
on principles of general law, and nowhere asserted a right
which might be defeated or sustained by one or another
construction of the Constitution or of any law of the United
States. Compare Little York Gold Washing and Water
Company v. Keyes, 96 U. S.i99.

ATTORNEY AND CLIENT.

In Powell v. Galveston, etc., Railway Company, 78 S.W.
975, the Court of Civil Appeals of Texas holds that where
Assignment
a person having a claim for personal injuries
of Claim
assigned an undivided one-half interest in the
cause of action, after suit brought, to his attorney in consideration of legal services, and thereafter the defendant in the
action settled with the claimant with notice of the assignment.
the attorney was entitled to prosecute the original suit to
judgment in his own interest and to recover to the extent
thereof. In a case somewhat analogous to this, viz., McCurdy v. Dillon, 98 N. W. 746, a recent decision by the
Supreme Court of Michigan, it is decided that a contract
between attorney and client providing for a fee based on a
percentage of the alimony to be recovered in a divorce case,
the basis of compensation in case of settlement to be a minimum amount of $2ooo, and a similar contract in an assault
and battery case between the husband and wife, pending at
the same time as the divorce case, were against public policy,
as tending to prevent a reconciliation between the parties.,
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BANKRUPTCY,

In Wilsey v. Jewett Bros. & Co., 98 N. W. 114, the
Supreme Court of Iowa holds that the fact that Lplaintiff,
maintensuce after commencement of an action, made oath
of Action
in bankraptcy proceedings that he had no property, claims, or causes of action which he could transfer to
his creditors does not estop him from maintaining the action.

BENEFICIAL ASSOCIATIONS.

The by-laws of a beneficial association provided that the
beneficiary might be either a member of the family of the
insured, or one related to him by blood, or one
Vested
Rights:
dependent upon him, but did not require that
Divorced Wife such beneficiary at the time of the death of the
insured should belong to one of such classes. A member
designated his wife as beneficiary, and she retained the certificate until his death, twenty-four years thereafter, and
eight years after his divorce from her. Under these facts
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, with Mr. Chief Justice
Mitchell dissenting, holds in Brown v. Grand Lodge
A. 0. U. W., 57 Atl. 176, that she was entitled to the
benefits, though her husband subsequently remarried, where
he continued to support his first wife and her children until
his death. See McCarthy v. Supreme Lodge, 26 N. E. 866.
BILLS AND NOTES.

It is decided by the Court of Appeals of Kentucky in
Wm. Deering & Co. v. Veal, 78 S. W. 886, that where a
Surety: Nowife signed a note, at her husband's request,
tice to Pay as his surety, and gave it to him, she made him
her agent to deliver it, and is bound by his representation
that she signed it as principal, so that she is liable, though
the time has passed in which limitations run as to a surety.
It is held, further, that the fact that a wife signed a note
on the second line for signatures was not sufficient to give
notice to the payee, who accepted it in settlement of notes
previously given by her husband, that she signed it as
surety, and not as principal. Compare Smith v. Moberly,
49 Ky. 268.

PROGRESS OF THE "LAW.
CARRIERS.

The Supreme Court of Tennessee holds in Nashville, C.
& St. L. R. Co. v.'Lillie, 78 S. W.. 1055, that where a pasPassengers'
-Luggage

senger carried -a valise into a sleeping-car and
deposited it on his seat, and afterwards, ,on

retiring, placed it under his berth, the valise was in effect
placed in charge of the railroad company, and hence it was
an insurer thereof. This decision is of special interest in
its relation to the cases where the passenger retains a partial
control over his baggage. In connection with it should be
noticed the case of Lewis v. N. Y. Sleeping-Car Company,
143 Mass. 267, and Pullman Palace Car Company v. Lowe,
28 Nebr. 239.

The vexed question as to whether a common carrier may
relieve itself from liability for negligence to a person travelPasses,

Limitation of

ling on a pass is involved in a case before the
United States Supreme Court decided in Janu-

Liability
ary of this year, it being there held that a stipulation in a railway pass that the railway company shall not be
liable to the user "under any circumstances, whether of
negligence of agents or otherwise, for any injury to the
person," violates no 'rule of public policy, and relieves the
company from liability for personal injuries resulting from
the ordinary negligence of its employees to one riding on
the pass who has accepted it with knowledge of its conditions: Northern Pacific Railway Company v. Adams, 24
S. C. R. 4o8.

CITIES.

The Court of Appeals of Maryland decides in Westninster Water Company, v. Mayor, etc., of City of WestUltra-vIre,
Contracts

minster, 56 Atl. 99 o , that a contract of a city
to annually levy taxes, and pay the proceeds

to a water company, for water furnished to the city for
all time to come, is, in the absence of prior express legislative sanction,. ultra-vires. Such contract will not be
treated as one for a' definite period of years-viz., the number of years for which the company is-chartered. An ultravires contract, it is said, is not protected by the contract
clause of the Federal Constitution.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

A statute of Vermont provided that no person should,
in a sale of property, without being subject to a fine of not
AntiTradlig- less than twenty dollars nor more thpafi five
Sta-p Act
hundred dollars for each offence, give or deliver
in connection therewith any stamp or coupon entitling
the purchaser to receive from any person or company,
other than the person making the sale, any other property
than that actually sold. The Supreme Court of that state
decides in State v. Dodge, 56 Atl. 983, that the statute
violates the fourteenth amendment to the United States
Constitution, which provides that no state shall pass any
law abridging the privileges or immunities of citizens of
the United States, nor deprive any person of property without due process of law. The scheme of giving tradingstamps, it is said, it not unlawful, as demoralizing to legitimate business, it differing from ordinary business only in
the method of advertising. Compare State 'v. Dalton, 22
R. 77.
CONTRACTS.

The Supreme Court of Michigan decides in Sullivan v.
Detroit, Y. & A. A. Ry. Co., 98 N. W. 759, that a contract
,Per.-a-e.t whereby a corporation agreed to give an attorney " permanent employment" as counsel if he
Employwould render certain services and the scheme
wet:Constructlon involved should prove a success was satisfied
by his employment thereafter for the period of a year at a
fixed salary.
CORPORATIONS.

It is decided by the Court of Appeals of Kentiwky in
Scottish Security Co.'s Receiver v. Starks, 78 S. W. 455,
subscription that where one subscribed for stock merely to
to Stock
enable the other subscribers to incorporate, and
after such inc6rporation he was released from the stibscription by the unanimous consent of the other subscribers, and while the corporation had no outstanding debts,
the release is valid, and subsequent creditors Icannot complain. It is further held that the validity of the cancellation of a subscription to the stock of a corporation whose
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CORPORATIONS (Continued).

chief office is in state X. is governed by the law of that
state, though the incorporation was under the laws of another state.

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE.

The relaxation of the rule of the common law which
forbade a defendant to testify leads to more or less frequent
difficulty, notwithstanding the rule that no comFailure of
Defendant to ments are to be made upon his failure to testify.
Testify
Thus in Hoff v. State, 35 Southern, 95 o , the
-Supreme Court of Mississippi, dealing with such a suit,
holds that remarks of the district attorney in closing to the
jury that "nobody on earth denies" that defendant had
written a certain letter, and that "no living soul has denied
that defendant seduced this little girl," were comments on
defendant's failure to testify and constituted reversible
error. With this case compare Reddick v. State, 72 Miss.
ioo8.
EVIDENCE.

The admissibility of documentary evidence tending t6

establish the guilt of an acctised of the offence charged is
Unreasonable not affected because it was secured in violation
Searches
of the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures: Supreme Court of the
United States in Adams v. People of the State of New
York, 24 S. C. R. 372. See also the leading case of Commonwealth v. Dana,2 Metc. 329.
In an action to recover for wrongful death of a relative
the Court of Civil Appeals of Texas holds in Smith v. InMclaration,

ternational and G. N. R. Co.,

78

S. W. 556,

that declarations of a person a few hours after
he was struck by a train, and a short time before he died, to the effect that he was asleep at the time
are admissible as against interest, irrespective of their admissibility as a part of the res gestw, and may be shown
even as against the parties who sue for their death.
against
Interest
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FIRE INSURANCE.

The Supreme Court of Minnesota holds in Hartley v.
Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co., 98 N. W. 198, that where the
Conditions of agent of a fire insurance company has knowledge of the true conditions surrounding insured
Property:
Waiver
property, and the company issues a policy in
which such conditions are restricted or prohibited, the same
are presumed to have been waived. This rule is applied in
the present case, where the policy prohibited the use of
gasoline upon the premises insured, but the agent had
knowledge of the fact that gasoline had been used, and that
it was the intention to continue its use for cooking purposes,
yet issued a policy without a special permit attached thereto.
Compare Brandup v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co.,
27 Minn. 393.
FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES.

The Supreme Court of Missouri, Division No. I,decides
in Davidson v. Dockery, 78 S.W. 624, that a devisee under
a will has no standing in equity to have set
Rights of
Vendee
aside a fraudulent conveyance of his testator,
as he takes under the testator and is in no better position in
that regard than he.
In Wolfsberger v. Mort, 78 S. W. 817, the Court of
Appeals at St. Louis, Missouri, holds that an insolvent
Transactions
between Husband and Wife

debtor cannot systematically give practically all
to accumulate property in her own name, which,
his earnings to his wife, and thereby allow her

if acquired by him, would be subject to levy. It is further
decided that in proportion as a husband's money is used
for the purchase of property by his wife in her own name
she holds the same in trust for him, and it may be subjected
to a judgment against him.
HUSBAND AND WIFE.

In Louisville & N. R. R. Co. v. Dick, 78 S. W. 914,
the Court of Appeals of Kentucky holds that in an action
by a married woman for personal injuries plainInjury to
Wife:
tiff may recover for any impairment of her
power to earn money, though there is no proof
Damages
that she had ever earned any money. See also South Covington and Cincinnati Street Railway Company v. Bolt, 59
S. W. 26.
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INSANITY.

In Coburn v. Raymond, 57 AtI. I I6, the Supreme Court
of Errors of Connecticut holds that an incompetent suing
to avoid a conveyance made while not under
Contracts:
Return of
guardianship to one acting in good faith, and
Consideration without knowledge of the incompetency, must,
as a condition precedent to relief, return the consideration;
but the court decides that where a mother was present when
an incompetent daughter executed a deed, and did not inform the innocent ultimate grantee of the incompetency,
she was estopped from afterwards, as heir of the daughter,
suing to avoid the deed for incompetency. See on the
former of these holdings Eaton v. Eaton, 37 N. J. Law,
io8, and Young v. Stevens, 48 N. H. 133.

INTERSTATE COMMERCE.

.The Supreme Court of the United States holds in County
of St. Clair v. Interstate Sand and Car Transfer Company,
24 S. C. R. 300, that an unconstitutional burFerries
den is imposed on interstate commerce by a
state act penalizing the carrying on of a ferry without a
license, :when applied to the transportation of loaded or
unloaded railroad cars across the Mississippi River from
the Illinois to the Missouri shore, even assuming that a
state may regulate a ferry upon a navigable stream forming the boundary between the two states, where such statute
nriakes the granting of the license discretionary, with citizens
of Illinois preferred, and compels the licensee to conduct a
general ferry business. See Conway v. Taylor, i Black,
6o3.
LIBEL.

The Supreme Court of Indiana decides in Wabash R. Co.
v. Young, 69 N. E. OO3, that an allegation in a complaint
laclistng

to the effect that defendant, by whom plaintiff
had previously been employed, had "black-

listed" plaintiff, showed no cause of action in libel in the
absence of any allegation that blacklisting imputed to plaintiff the commission of a crime, or other conduct exposing
him to public hatred, punishment, and disgrace.
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LICENSES.

In Maple Orchard Grove and Vineyard Co. v. Marshall,
75 Pac. 369, the Supreme Court of Utah decides that a
of the owner
Revocab lltY parol license to enter on the land
to construct a pipe-line to carry water for plprposes of irrigation operates as an irrevocable grant after
entry and the construction of the pipe-line at considerable
expense, and after commencing the use of the water for
purposes of irrigation the rights acquired under the grant
will be protected in equity. With this case compare Huff
v. McCauley, 53 Penna. 2o6.

MANDAMUS.

A student of a law school who has been wrongfully expelled without notice is entitled to mandamus to compel his
restoration to membership whether the school
Law-School
Students
is organized for profit or not: Court of Appeals
of Maryland in Baltimore University of Baltimore City v.
Colton, 57 Atl. 14. An action at law for damages for
expulsion from a law school before graduation is not, it is
held, an adequate remedy, precluding a resort to mandamus
for reinstatement.
MARRIED WOMEN.

A husband platted his wife's land with her knowledge
and consent, and the subdivision was designated on the
map as that of the husband. The map was reDedication
corded with the consent of the wife, but was
never acknowledged by her. Thereafter the wife conveyed
by properly acknowledged deeds according to the streets
and alleys on the map. On these facts the Supreme Court
of Texas decides in City of Corsicana v. Zorn, 78 S. W.
924, that this constituted a sufficient dedication of the alleys
and streets in question to the public.
In Indiana the statute law, similar to that in many of the
states of the United States, forbids married women to enter
into contracts of suretyship. In Webb v. John
Contracts:
Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 69 N. E. ioo6,
Suretyship
the Supreme Court of that state decides that such statute
prohibits married wom~n from either personally obligating
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MARRIED WOMEN (Continued).

themselves as sureties for another or mortgaging their separate property for the debt of another. In connection with
this case the decisions in Kuhn v. Ogilvie, 178 Pa. 3o4, and
Dusenberry v. Insurance Company, i88 Pa. 46o, are of
interest.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
In Twyman's Adm'r v. Board of Councilmen of Frankfort, 78 S. W. 446, the Court of Appeals of Kentucky holds
Governmental that where a city was authorized to establish
Fanctions
hospitals and make all necessary regulations for
the protection of the public health, and in pursuance thereof
established a pesthouse for persons suffering from contagious diseases, acts of the city's officers in maintaining
such house and in removing thereto plaintiff's intestate,
who had smallpox, and in caring for him there until he
died, were acts performed by the city in its public, governmental capacity, and not in its corporate and private
capacity, and hence it was not liable for negligence in the
performance thereof. See Taylor v. City of Owensboro,
98 Ky. 271.
In Lowe v. Conroy, 97 N. W. 942, the Supreme Court
of Wisconsin, holding that a municipal corporation is not
Liability for liable for the value of property destroyed by
mistake on the order of its health officers, deLands of
Agents
cides, however, that a health officer is personally
liable for the destruction of cattle which were not in fact a
nuisance or cause of sickness, endangering the public health,
but were mistakenly adjudged by him so to be. See in
connection with this case Hubbell v. Goodrick, 37 Wis. 84.

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT.

In Tabet v. Powell, 78 S. W. 997, the Court of Civil
Appeals of Texas decides that where a person injured in a
Authority of collision with a railroad train gave to his brother
Agent
full charge of the matter, and told the claim

agent that any settlement would have to be made with the
brother, such authority authorized the brother to bind the
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PRINCIPAL AND AGENT (Continued).

person injured by a contract employing an attorney to prosecute the claim against the railroad company, agreeing to
pay such attorney one-half of the amount recovered, and
securing such payment by an assignment of one-half of the
cause of action.
PUBLIC RECORDS.

The Court of Appeals of New York deals, In re Molineaux, 69 N. W. 727, with the appeal in this case from
Photographs the Supreme Court, and, affirming the judgment
of Convicts

of the court below, rendered in 84 N. Y. Supp.

1136, holds that where the photograph of a convict has
been taken and measurements made and recorded in the
manner provided by the statute they constitute public
records, and, though he may be acquitted on a subsequent
trial, he is not entitled to compel the Superintendent of City
Prisons to deliver such records to him.

RAILROADS.

The consignee of two carloads of coke was notified upon
their arrival that a charge for rental would be made if they
Bulk Freight: were riot unloaded within forty-eight hours.
The notification was in compliance with the rules
Rental
of an association of railroads organized for the
Charges:
Lien
purpose of facilitating the unloading of cars,
and the charges made for the rental was much less than the
average earning capacity of freight cars. The railroad company had at the point of destination no warehouse for the
unloading of bulk freight such as coke. Under these circumstances the Supreme Court of Illinois decides that a
railroad company was entitled to charge rental for the use
of the cars after the expiration of a reasonable time for
unloading and to enforce a lien upon the freight for the
rental charges: Schumacher v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co,,
69 N. E. 825. It is also held that on the issue as to what
was a reasonable time evidence as to the distance of the
consignee's home from the station was not admissible. The
case presents an interesting review of the authorities in
point. As to the important holding with regard to the lien
see Miller v. Mansfield, 112 Mass. 26o.
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SURETIES.

One who, as agent of an insurance company, had been
guilty of embezzlement, was appointed agent of a new
company formed with the same stockholders
Discharge:
Failure to
and officers, and it took a bond for the faithful
Disclose Em. performance of his contract of employment
bezzlement
Peepomn
without giving the sureties notice of his em-

bezzlement, of which it had knowledge: Under these circumstances the Appellate Court of Indiana, Division No. 2,
holds in Indiana and Ohio Live Stock Ins. Co. v. Bender,
69 N. W. 691, that the sureties were not bound. To withhold such information, it is decided, is bad faith and prevents a recovery on the bond. In connection with this case
the decision of the New Jersey court in Sooy v. State, 39
N. J. Law, 135, is worthy of study.

TELEGRAPH.

The State of Texas furnishes many decisions on the question of the liability of telegraph companies for damages
Damages

from failure or delay in delivering messages.

An interesting case occurs in Western Union
Telegraph Co. v. Swearingin, 78 S. W. 491., where it is
held that damages from a father's failure to be present at
his son's funeral on account of delay in the transmission of
a telegram reading, "Come, Frank is dead," are within the
contemplation of the parties to the contract of transmission
and are recoverable, though a reply message from the father
would have been necessary to secure a postponement of the
funeral so as to admit of his reaching the place of interment
in time. See also Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Norris,
68 S.W. 982.
WILLS.

The Supreme Court of Indiana in Branstratorv. Crow,
69 N. E. 668, discusses the general questions as to the preCapacity of
Testator:

sumptions with regard to the sanity of a tes-

tator.

It is there held that it is only where

Presumption mental unsoundness is of a character -o appear

permanent, and to forbid the reasonable expectation of recovery, that a presumption of the continuance of such
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WILLS (Continued).

unsoundness will be indulged. It does not arise from intermittent temporary unsoundness, resulting from sickness,
injury, intoxication, or other transitory cause, so that an
instruction .stating that, where it has been established that
a person is of unsound mind, the presumption is that that
state of unsoundness continues until the contrary is shown,
is too broad. See in connection with this case Blough v.
Parr, 144 Ind. 463.

